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ONTOLOGICAL DETERMINATION
AND THE GROUNDING OBJECTION
TO COUNTERFACTUALS OF FREEDOM
Theodore Guleserian

Alvin Plantinga's reply to the grounding objection to propositions now called
counterfactuals of freedom, originally made by Robert Adams, can be inter
preted as follows: if, for the sake of argument, we require counterfactuals
of freedom to be grounded in something that makes them true, we can sim
ply (and trivially) say that there are corresponding counterfactual facts that
ground them. I argue that such facts, together with the facts about the situ
ations in which moral agents find themselves, would ontologically determine
that the agents perform their acts, rendering these acts unfree. Thus, I main
tain that, contrary to Plantinga's intent, allowing the grounding facts into the
divine creation situation entails the falsity of Molinism. If there is no other
way that God can know what free creatures would do than through counterfactuals of freedom, divine foreknowledge of human acts is inconsistent with
human freedom and moral responsibility.

I
According to Alvin Plantinga's well known conception1of what have since
come to be called the "counterfactuals of freedom," God, by knowing
these subjunctive conditional propositions about his creatures (or creature
essences), the truth values of which are not within his will to determine, is
able to know what any free creature would do in any situation. This view
has also come to be known as Molinism, named after its originator, the
sixteenth century Jesuit priest Luis de Molina. On Plantinga's view, these
propositions are expressed by sentences of the form
(1) If x were in situation S, then x would do act A
where situation S includes the condition that agent x is free with respect to
doing A and free with respect to refraining from doing A. Here, act A is to
be thought of as an act-particular, not an act type. The grounding objection,
famously voiced by Robert Adams especially in "Plantinga and the Prob
lem of Evil,"2 can perhaps be most simply stated as follows: counterfactuals
of freedom are not true because there is nothing to make them true. As I shall
indicate in the quotation below, Plantinga questions the need for these
propositions to be grounded in anything, but he suggests that if a ground is
needed it would be a kind of counterfactual fact. I intend to argue that these
facts, together with the agents' situations, would ontologically determine that
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the agents perform these acts, and hence that the acts of the created agents
which are assumed to be free are not free.
II
In his "Replies"3 Alvin Plantinga considers two objections of Robert Ad
ams to the view that there are true counterfactuals of freedom, the first
of which has come to be known as the grounding objection. I suggest that,
where situation S includes the condition that agent x is free with respect
to doing act A, the species of statements of the form
(1) if x were in situation S, then x would do act A
should properly be called the subjunctive conditionals of freedom. The va
riety of subjunctive conditionals wherein the antecedent is contingently
false can then be deemed to be the (genuine) counterfactuals of freedom. Even
among those who are willing to assume that some agents are free in the
Libertarian sense, it is a matter of dispute that there are at least some true
subjunctive conditionals of freedom. Robert Adams seems to hold that all
such conditionals of freedom are false,4 as does William Hasker.5 Hasker
also calls into question David Lewis's axiom that for any two true proposi
tions p and q, it is true that if p were true then q would be true.6 I think that
Hasker is right to question this axiom in all its generality. However, one
can reject the general principle but recognize certain types of true instances
of it. I want to allow the epistemic possibility that there are some true sub
junctive conditionals of freedom. If George is in situation S in which he is
free to attack Yorktown at time t, and George does attack Yorktown at t, it
surely seems to be true that if George were in situation S, he would attack
Yorktown at t. His being in S, together with his act of attacking Yorktown
at t, make it true that if George were in S he would attack Yorktown at t.7
I can think of no counterexamples to the principle that any subjunctive
conditional of freedom (as specified above) that has true antecedent and
true consequent is true. The consequent of such a proposition has a builtin relevance to its antecedent due to the metaphysical connection between
the act-particular mentioned in the consequent and the freedom to do the
act assumed in the antecedent. This relevance filters out the counterex
amples to Lewis's axiom.8 So, in my judgment, the grounding objection is
best deemed to be an objection to the truth of the genuine counterfactuals
of freedom, where the relevant situation does not obtain and in which in
many cases the relevant act never takes place. The objection can be simply
restated as follows: genuine counterfactuals of freedom are not true be
cause there is nothing that makes them true.9
Plantinga's response to the grounding objection is first to express doubts
about the thesis that "if a proposition is true, then something grounds its
truth, . . . or makes it true."10 The doubt he raises is one as to whether every
true proposition is grounded in something that makes it true. It is his sec
ond response that I want to examine. In it, he is willing to assume, if only
for the sake of argument, that there is something that grounds statements
of the form 2
(2) Yesterday I freely performed some action A
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and something that grounds genuine counterfactuals, such as:
(3)

If Curley were offered a $35,000 bribe, he would take it.11

He states:
But suppose we concede, for purposes of argument, that proposi
tions must be thus grounded. . . . Suppose, then, that yesterday I
freely performed some action A. . . . So what grounds the truth of the
proposition in question? Perhaps you will say that what grounds its
truth is just that in fact I did A. But this isn't much of an answer; and
at any rate the same kind of answer is available in the case of Curley.
For what grounds the truth of the counterfactual, we may say, is just
that in fact Curley is such that if he had been offered a $35,000 bribe,
he would have freely taken it.12
What I want to do here is to take this second response seriously, and not just
"for purposes of argument." I believe that if any counterfactuals are true,
there must be something that makes them true. I take David Armstrong's
general position that truth requires a truthmaker to be overwhelmingly
plausible.13 I intend to flesh out Plantinga's response ontologically, and
then to argue that adding this body of ontological assumptions to Plantin
ga's existing ontological framework has as a consequence that either agents
are not truly free and morally responsible or no genuine counterfactuals
of freedom are true. On either alternative, Molinism is false.
We want to know, What could be the ground, the truthmaker, of a genu
ine counterfactual of freedom? Two ontological expressions come to mind
which could be used in an answer: 'state of affairs' and 'fact.' What is the
difference between a state of affairs and a fact? On some uses of these terms,
nothing. But on others, there are important differences. On one conception
of states of affairs, they are wholly abstract entities that exist necessarily,
none of which have contingently existing concrete objects as constituents.
Within this conception there are two species. (i) States of affairs are struc
tured entities that have only abstract entities as constituents. The state of
affairs of Socrates being snub-nosed contains no individuals, only prop
erties and perhaps a relation; an essence of Socrates rather than Socrates
himself is the subject constituent. Alternatively within this view, states of
affairs are structured entities that have only abstract entities and possible
concrete individuals as constituents. In the latter case, the merely possible
concrete individuals are necessary existents, just as are the abstract con
stituents. The state of affairs that Socrates is snub-nosed has the possible
individual Socrates as a subject constituent. If the state of affairs obtains
(is actual), then Socrates is actual. (ii) States of affairs are utterly simple
entities like sets. Like sets, they have no constituents but have relations to
the various entities they are "about." Unlike some sets, they all exist neces
sarily, and are not dependent on the entities that they are "about." Under
either of these views, truthmakers could be conceived of, i.e., not identified
with but at least defined in terms of, states of affairs provided that states of
affairs are distinct from propositions, distinct from the propositions that they make
true. The proposition that Socrates is snub-nosed cannot make itself true.
If the state of affairs of Socrates being snub-nosed, or more accurately the
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obtaining (or being actual) of that state of affairs, makes the proposition that
Socrates is snub-nosed true, the obtaining (or actual) state of affairs (i.e.,
the truthmaker) must be distinct from the proposition made true.
In Plantinga's ontology, states of affairs, even actual states of affairs, are
purely abstract entities, just as propositions are. Both states of affairs and
propositions exist necessarily, both exist in every possible world. In fact,
there is (intentionally) no clear distinction made in his system between
propositions and states of affairs.14 In his framework, no state of affairs or
proposition has a contingently existing concrete individual as a constituent.
Since in Plantinga's system there are no merely possible individuals, Socrates
cannot be a constituent of the state of affairs of Socrates being snub-nosed,
which exists in every world, including worlds in which Socrates does not.
Plantinga does not commit himself to an answer to the question of whether
there is a distinction between states of affairs and propositions, perhaps
because for his purposes he does not need to. So we don't know whether
in Plantinga's framework actual states of affairs could be construed to be
truthmakers of propositions, including such propositions as counterfactuals of freedom. Still, it is clear that in his framework the proposition
(4) That Socrates is snub-nosed
and the state of affairs of
(5) Socrates being snub-nosed
are both such that if they are structured entities that have constituents,
all of those constituents are abstract entities, such as essences and other
properties and relations.
The other ontological type of entity that could serve as a truthmaker is
a fact. The difference between a state of affairs (as conceived above) and a
fact is that a fact cannot exist independently of whatever it is "about." The
fact that Socrates is snub-nosed cannot exist independently of Socrates,
whereas the state of affairs of Socrates being snub-nosed does exist inde
pendently of (the actual individual) Socrates but does not obtain (does not
have actuality) independently of the existence of (the actual) Socrates. With
facts, there is no distinction between existing and obtaining (being actual).
Under this conception of facts, there are two species that mirror the two
species of views regarding states of affairs, namely, (i) facts are structured
entities, and (ii) facts are simple entities that nevertheless have an onto
logical dependency on whatever they are "about," just as sets have on
their members. (There are yet other views, ones that consign the role of
individuals to "aspects" of facts or else ultimately eliminate individuals
or reduce all discourse about individuals to discourse about facts. We can
consider such facts to be simples or safely just ignore these as they will not
affect the principal arguments.) On the structured view, Socrates is liter
ally a constituent of the fact that Socrates is snub-nosed, as is the property
of being snub-nosed.
Of these four alternative possible conceptions of truthmakers, I take the
conception of facts as structured entities to be the most philosophically sat
isfactory view as to the nature of what makes propositions such as (2), (3),
and (4) true. So, in exploring Plantinga's second response, in which he is
willing to assume—if only for the sake of argument—that counterfactuals
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of freedom like (3) are grounded, I will adopt a sketch of a theory of facts as
structured entities. We need to adopt a specific conception of truthmakers
to explore Plantinga's for-the-sake-of-argument response. But my conclu
sion will not in the end depend on which of the four views of truthmakers
outlined above one adopts. The conclusion is not affected by the nature of
the truthmaker. Analogous arguments will go through on any one of the
four conceptions of a truthmaker, or indeed on any conception of truthmakers that I know of.
Now, in taking Plantinga's second response seriously, I am adding facts
to his existing ontology, to provide what I believe can be the most philo
sophically satisfactory truthmakers of propositions like (4) and of propo
sitions expressed by (2) and (3). But I am taking first order singular facts,
such as the one depicted by proposition (4), to have concrete particulars,
such as Socrates himself, as constituents. What makes the fact that Socrates
is snub-nosed such a good truthmaker for proposition (4) is that it is a piece
of reality involving a real concrete object. I take the real world to be, as the
early Wittgenstein says, a totality of facts. We can continue to speak of the
possible worlds, including the actual world, as maximally consistent states
of affairs (or better, propositions) and hence as abstract entities. But unlike
merely possible states of affairs, there are, on my view, no merely possible
facts. A fact either exists or it doesn't. Now, I'm not going to attempt to give
an entire theory of facts or anything close to it. I won't assume that there
are general facts, or negative facts, or disjunctive facts, or even conditional
facts. Nor will I assume that there are none. I will assume that there are
singular facts, facts that are contingent and facts that are necessary, facts
that attribute a property to a single (concrete or abstract) entity, and facts
that attribute a relation to two or more entities. I will assume that there
is such a thing as an aggregate or sum or conjunction of facts. And I will
assume that logical constants, quantifiers, and operators can enter into
expressions that designate properties. So, I allow that there are conjunc
tive properties, conditional properties, and even subjunctive conditional
properties, such as the property that x has such that if x were offered a
$35,000 bribe, x would take it.
So first order singular facts make first order singular propositions true.
The truth does not make the facts exist, rather the facts make the truth
exist. The truthmaker relation can be conceived to be a relation between
a fact and a proposition: the fact makes the proposition true. But there is
a fundamental relation involved here that can be used to partially specify
the truthmaker relation, namely, ontological determination. We can say that
fact F is a truthmaker of proposition p only if F ontologically determines
the fact that p is true. I think of the relation of ontological determination as
being irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. Like others, I take ontologi
cal determination to be best understood through some form of entailment.
Some restrict the form of entailment to a relevance relation, such as cap
tured in the Anderson-Belnap system E of entailment.15 I think that it may
be necessary to accept ontological determination as a primitive, and give
axioms for it as one would for any primitive term. I have no doubt that an
investigation of this notion will reveal an entire family of relations, just as
have the notions of implication, strict implication, and entailment (includ
ing relevance relations).
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Putting that and other details aside, let us say that fact F1 entails fact F2
just in case F1 exists and F2 exists and the proposition that fact F1 exists
entails the proposition that fact F2 exists. Then we can assert: a necessary
condition for fact F1 to ontologically determine fact F2 is that F1 entails F2.
But there are plenty of cases where F1 coentails F2. In some of these cases,
there is no ontological dependency, and neither fact determines the other.
This is the case for many pairs of necessary facts, e.g., that triangles have
three sides, and that squares have four angles. However, there are also
cases of coentailment wherein there is a one-way determination. Here are
some cases:
(6) The fact that Plato is broad-shouldered
coentails
(7) The fact that the proposition that Plato is broad-shouldered is true.
Our intuitions tell us that while (7) entails (6), as well as conversely, it is (6)
that ontologically determines (7) because the truth is determined by real
ity rather than the other way around. Here are a couple of cases of onto
logical determination that do not directly involve one fact making true the
propositional constituent of another fact. The fact that the number 3 exists
ontologically determines the fact that the unit set of the number 3 exists
(even though they also coentail each other). The fact that part a, part b ,
and part c of an object have mass ontologically determines the fact that the
object has mass. There are many more examples involving the part-whole
relationship: the positions of the outermost parts of an object ontologically
determine the shape, the volume, and the position of that object.
Assuming that, necessarily, God exists and his will never fails, the fact
that God wills that Earth is the third planet of Sol during time t ontologi
cally determines the fact that Earth is the third planet of Sol during time
t. The latter fact in turn ontologically determines the fact that God's belief
that Earth is the third planet of Sol during t is true . These ontological rela
tionships hold in spite of the coentailment of each pair of these three facts.
Notice that while these relationships are not causal, the relation between
the fact about God's volition and the fact about Earth somewhat resembles
causality. It is not causality because it is not a relation that contingently
holds between the two facts. Causality holds contingently and only be
tween events (including temporal states), which are facts that essentially
have a time as a constituent.
As there are cases of causal overdetermination , so also are there cases of
ontological overdetermination . For example, the fact that Socrates is snub
nosed and the fact that Plato is broad-shouldered ontologically overde
termine the fact that the proposition that either Socrates is snub-nosed or
Plato is broad-shouldered is true. Again, assuming the impossibility of
the failure of his will, perhaps God's volition is sufficient to ontologically
determine the truth of his belief that Earth is the third planet of Sol during
t. If so, then the truth of his belief may be ontologically overdetermined
by that knowledge and the fact that Earth is the third planet of Sol during
t. It is important to notice that the ontological determination of a fact is a
sufficient condition for the existence of that fact. It may also be a necessary
condition, as in the case of the fact that individual o exists ontologically
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determines that a unit set of individual o exists. But it need not be a neces
sary condition. In some cases the ontologically determined fact may have
counterfactual independence from the ontologically determining fact. Fact F2
is counterfactually independent of fact F1 just in case if F1 were to exist then
F2 would exist and if F1 were not to exist F2 would (still) exist. Ontological
overdetermination provides just one case of this kind of independence.
(From this point forward, the term 'independent' will always be used in
the sense of 'counterfactually independent' just defined, unless explicitly
specified otherwise.) There may also be cases in which F1 ontologically
determines F2, but F2 would exist without F1 and without being ontologi
cally determined by any other fact. If F1 and F2 ontologically overdeter
mine F3, then F3 is only conditionally ontologically dependent upon F1. But
suppose now that F2 does not exist, F1 ontologically determines F3, no fact
other than F1 ontologically determines F3, and F3 is not independent of
F1. Then F3 is unconditionally ontologically dependent on F1.16
When the paragraph from Plantinga's "Replies" quoted above is in
terpreted in terms of facts, what it states is that just as the proposition
expressed by (2) is made true by the fact that yesterday I did act A, the
proposition expressed by
(3) If Curley were offered a $35,000 bribe, he would take it
can be deemed to be made true by:
(8) The fact that Curley has the property of being such that if he were
offered a $35,000 bribe, he would take it.
Let's call Plantinga's framework when enhanced by facts 'P+'. It is in P+
that we are to understand Plantinga's paragraph quoted above. It is only
in P+, and not in Plantinga's own framework, that the fact (8) exists.
In Plantinga's own framework one can specify states of affairs that
Alfred Freddoso calls 'creation situations.'17 A creation situation in this
framework is a state of affairs that includes all and only actual states of
affairs that are not directly or indirectly within God's power to actualize.18
Such a state of affairs includes all necessary states of affairs and all ac
tual states of affairs depicted by true subjunctive conditionals of freedom.
There is a state of affairs that is the actual world, which includes just one
creation situation, the actual creation situation, which includes the genu
ine counterfactual state of affairs depicted by (3) above:
(S3) The state of affairs that if Curley were offered a $35,000 bribe, he
would take it.
Propositions are also necessary existents, along with states of affairs; so
the following proposition exists:
(P3) The proposition that if Curley were offered a $35,000 bribe, he
would take it.
Hence, the following state of affairs
(SP3)

The state of affairs that (P3) is true

is included in the actual creation situation in Plantinga's framework.
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Now, P+ contains all of this; but it also contains facts as truthmakers.
There will be not only the actual world (an abstract entity) but also the
real world, a highly complex totality of facts, including facts that have real
concrete objects as constituents. In addition to the abstract actual creation
situation, there is the real creation situation, which is that totality of facts
that are beyond God's power to create or prevent.19 It would seem that it is
to the latter that we must look to find truthmakers for the genuine counterfactuals, such as (P3), if these counterfactuals are to be made true inde
pendently of any of God's decisions. But (P3) cannot be made true by the
presence of fact (8) in the actual or real creation situations because fact (8)
cannot exist in either creation situation. For fact (8) has a real, contingent,
concrete object as a subject constituent, to which a subjunctive conditional
property is attributed, and such created concrete objects cannot exist in
any creation situation in either framework. If there are conditional facts,
the same point will apply to this one:
(F3) The fact that if Curley were offered a $35,000 bribe, he would take it.
In spite of being a conditional fact, this fact has a contingent concrete ob
ject as a constituent, unlike (P3) or (S3) which may have Curley's essence,
but not the actual individual Curley himself, as a constituent. So if, con
trary to the solution suggested by Plantinga's paragraph, fact (8) or even
(F3) cannot make (P3) true in the real creation situation, what fact in that
situation can do it?
Where E is an essence of Curley, the following sort of fact, if it exists in
the real creation situation, would be a truthmaker of proposition (P3):
(9) The fact that E has the property of being such that if the instantia
tion of E were offered a $35,000 bribe, the instantiation of E would
take it.
If the genuine counterfactual proposition (P3) is true in Plantinga's frame
work, as we are assuming, then fact (9) exists in the real creation situation
in P+. This can be true precisely because, unlike fact (8), neither the truth
of (P3) nor the existence of fact (9) requires the existence of Curley. Now,
fact (9) in the real creation situation is a truthmaker of proposition (P3).
This entails that fact (9) ontologically determines (FP3):
(FP3) The fact that (P3) is true.
Next, let's ask what happens when God decides to create Curley, i.e., when
he brings about:
(10) The fact that Curley exists.
My objection to Plantinga's defense of Molinism rests on this claim: that
facts (9) and (10) not only jointly entail fact (8); they jointly ontologically
determine fact (8). I find this claim to be overwhelmingly plausible, and I
believe that it would be recognized by those who object to Molinism as a
fundamental basis for the objection to that doctrine. Thus, the source of
Curley's having his subjunctive (counterfactual) property (of being such
that if he were offered a $35,000 bribe, he would take it) is fact (9), a contin
gent fact about Curley's essence that exists independently of Curley.
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Could the Molinist reverse the direction of this argument? After all,
while (9) and (10) entail (8), they are also entailed by it. That is,
(8) The fact that Curley has the property of being such that if he were
offered a $35,000 bribe, he would take it
entails
(9) The fact that E has the property of being such that if the instantia
tion of E were offered a $35,000 bribe, the instantiation of E would
take it
and
(10) The fact that Curley exists.
Why not then say that the ontological determination goes the other way,
from (8) to (9) and (10)? Why not say that the fact that Curley has his sub
junctive (counterfactual) property ontologically determines that his es
sence has a corresponding subjunctive property, rather than allowing that
Curley's having his property is ontologically dependent on his essence's
having the corresponding property?
Fact (9) is being assumed to be the truthmaker of the true counterfac
tual proposition
(P3) If Curley were offered a $35,000 bribe, he would take it
because (P3) is being assumed to be true in the real creation situation, and
(P3) cannot be made true there by (8). For (8) assumes the existence of Cur
ley and hence (8) cannot exist in the real creation situation. Fact (9), that
the essence of Curley has the relevant subjunctive property, is thus being
assumed to be in the real creation situation, and therefore beyond God's
powers to bring about or prevent. Hence it seems that Curley's essence E
would have had this subjunctive conditional property whether or not God
had decided to create Curley, and hence whether or not fact (8) ever came
to exist. In other words, (9) is counterfactually independent of (10).20 And
hence it seems to be true that fact (8) is ontologically dependent on fact (9),
rather than (9) on (8), i.e., (8) is ontologically determined by the conjunc
tion of (9) and (10), rather than vice versa. Of course, it would be possible
for the Molinist to agree that (8) coentails the conjunction of (9) and (10)
but simply to deny that either side of the coentailment ontologically deter
mines the other. So too, I suppose, it would be possible to admit that the
fact that Socrates is snub-nosed coentails the fact that the proposition that
Socrates is snub-nosed is true, and yet to deny that either ontologically de
termines the other. In my judgment, this would have to be due to a certain
kind of blindness to the facts of ontological determination.
It is natural to suppose, however, that if the above holds for Curley's
essence, it holds for all the subjunctive conditional properties involving
freedom that belong to any essence of any free creature, whether those
properties turn out to be genuinely counterfactual or not. We have been
assuming that the case of Curley and his essence involves genuine counterfactuals. Now let us consider a case of a subjunctive conditional with true
antecedent and consequent. Where S is an essence of Socrates,

ONTOLOGICAL DETERMINISM, THE GROUNDING OBJECTION

403

(11) The fact that S has the property of being such that if the instantia
tion of S were offered escape from prison, the instantiation of S
would refuse
And
(12) The fact that Socrates exists
not only jointly entail
(13) The fact that Socrates has the property of being such that if he
were offered escape from prison, he would refuse;
facts (11) and (12) jointly ontologically determine fact (13). Finally, the fol
lowing comes to be:
(14) The fact that Socrates is offered escape from prison.
Fact (13) and fact (14), and more importantly also facts (11) and (14), onto
logically determine
(15) The fact that Socrates refuses to escape.
But this is inconsistent with the thesis that Socrates himself is morally re
sponsible for his act, and with the thesis that Socrates freely refuses to es
cape. For if the fact about his essence, together with the offer to escape,
ontologically determine that he refuses, he was not morally responsible
for his act, and he could not have avoided refusing to escape. I hold that
ontological determination of the act by facts about one's essence and situ
ation is just as inimical to both the moral significance and the freedom of
the act as temporally prior sufficient causal determination of the act is held
to be, within the Libertarian framework we are assuming.21
Let me be very clear on one point. To make it I'll first suggest an analogy.
If God has foreknowledge that Socrates refuses to escape, his foreknowl
edge entails but does not ontologically determine that Socrates refuses to es
cape. Rather, Socrates' act ontologically determines that God's forebelief
is true. That is one reason why God's foreknowledge would not threaten
human freedom. Just so, it is not the entailment of fact (15) by facts (11)
and (14) that is inconsistent with the freedom of Socrates to refuse. The
entailment could hold and Socrates' act still be freely performed. If under
Molinist assumptions it were plausible to maintain that facts (14) and (15)
jointly ontologically determine fact (11), and that (11) would not exist if (14)
and (15) were not to exist, so that the essence S of Socrates has its subjunc
tive property entirely due to the act in the situation of the offer,22 rather than
(11) and (14) ontologically determining (15), then the mere entailment of
(15) by (11) and (14) would present no problem for the Molinist. But is it
possible for the Molinist to hold that (14) and (15) jointly ontologically
determine (11)? I shall argue that it is not possible.
There are three prima facie possible ways in which the subjunctive con
ditionals of freedom might be related to the situations (in which the agents
are free with respect to their possible acts) and the actions that they choose
to perform. In considering these alternatives, one must keep in mind that
a fact F1 may ontologically determine F2 and yet F2 be counterfactually
independent of F1. But this is not to say that in every case in which F1
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ontologically determines F2, it is possible that F2 is counterfactually inde
pendent of F1.
(i) In every world, the subjunctive conditional is true if and only if the
relevant situation occurs and the agent performs the act referred to in the
conditional. The relevant situation and the agent's performance of the act
jointly ontologically determine the fact that is the immediate truthmaker
of the subjunctive conditional, namely, the fact that the agent has the prop
erty of being such that if the agent were in the situation, the agent would
do the act. The fact consisting of the agent's essence having its subjunctive
conditional property, together with the fact that the agent exists, do not on
tologically determine the truthmaker. Rather, the truthmaker ontologically
determines the fact consisting of the agent's essence having its subjunctive
conditional property. The fact consisting of the agent's essence having its
subjunctive property is not independent of the agent's existence, i.e., it is
not the case that the essence would have its property if the agent were to
fail to exist and hence not have its corresponding property.
(ii) In some worlds, some subjunctive conditionals are true even though
it is not the case that the relevant situations occur and the agents do the
acts referred to in those conditionals, but in every world in which the rele
vant situation occurs and the agent performs the act referred to in the con
ditional, the agent's being in the situation and performing the act jointly
ontologically determine the truthmaker of the subjunctive conditional.
(iii) Again, in some worlds, some subjunctive conditionals are true
even though it is not the case that in those worlds the relevant situations
occur and the agents do the acts referred to in those conditionals, and in
every world in which the relevant situation occurs and the agent performs
the act referred to in the conditional, the situation and the agent's perfor
mance of the act do not ontologically determine the truthmaker of the sub
junctive conditional. In every world, the truthmaker would exist whether
or not the situation ever arises and even whether or not the agent ever
exists. The truthmaker of the subjunctive conditional proposition, which
according to this alternative is the fact consisting of the agent's essence
having its subjunctive conditional property, is in every case independent
of the existence of the situation and the agent.
Clearly, alternative (i) could not be used by the Molinist, for two rea
sons. First, there would be no genuine counterfactuals of freedom, i.e.,
subjunctive conditionals of freedom with contingently false antecedents,
that are true. The only true subjunctive conditional of freedom on this
alternative would be one that is made true by the fact that makes its an
tecedent true together with the fact that makes its consequent true. That
is, (14) the fact that Socrates is offered escape from prison, together with
(15) the fact that Socrates refuses, ontologically determines (13) the fact
that Socrates has the property of being such that if he were offered escape
from prison he would refuse. The latter is the immediate truthmaker of
the subjunctive conditional proposition, and can also on this alternative
be viewed as ontologically determining the fact (11), which attributes
the corresponding subjunctive conditional property to the essence of
Socrates. This preserves the freedom of the individual, but only by giv
ing up of the possibility that God has foreknowledge of what free beings
would do by knowing the contents of the real or actual creation situation.
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Second, if every true subjunctive conditional of freedom is made true only
by the fact that makes its antecedent true together with the fact that makes
its consequent true, God would have power over the truth value of that
subjunctive conditional; for God could prevent the existence of such facts
simply by not creating the agent. But such a subjunctive conditional of
freedom could not be included in either the actual or the real creation situ
ation, since the only truths in a creation situation are those beyond God's
power. There would be no truthmakers of these propositions available
in the creation situation. And without an awareness of the truthmaker of
these contingent propositions, even God could not know which counterfactuals of freedom are true.23 If these propositions are excluded from the
creation situation, then God could not know what the relevant free beings
would do by knowing the contents of the creation situation.
Under alternative (ii) there are a number of prima facie possible subal
ternatives, all of which fall under one of two types. Subalternatives of the
first type are those in which the fact about the essence is not independent
of the fact that the agent exists, and on these the fact that the essence has
its subjunctive conditional property is ontologically determined by a fact
that requires the existence of the agent. These succumb to one of the same
objections as does alternative (i). On these subalternatives, the fact about
the essence could not be in the real creation situation, because God could
prevent the existence of such a fact by not creating the agent. However,
on first consideration, the subalternatives of the second type seem more
promising for a defense of Molinism, because they posit the counterfactual
independence of the fact that the essence has its subjunctive conditional
property from the agent's existence. This independence permits the fact
about the essence to be in the real creation situation. God could know just
by inspecting the creation situation what the agent would do, since the
fact about the essence with its subjunctive conditional property would be
there. This fact that the essence has its subjunctive conditional property is
not, on these scenarios, ontologically determined by anything requiring
the creation of the agent.
There is good reason to reject these subalternatives of the second type
as defenses of Molinism. The independence that they all claim for the es
sence's property is a two-edged sword. They all affirm that the fact that the
essence has its subjunctive conditional property is independent of the fact
that the agent exists. This means that the essence would have its property
whether or not the agent ever comes to exist. Hence, were the agent to
exist, the agent would immediately have its subjunctive conditional prop
erty to do act A when in situation S due to the fact that the essence has
its property and the fact that the agent exists. That is, the conjunction of
the two latter facts ontologically determines the fact that the agent has its
property. There are two closely related factors here that are incompatible
with the freedom and moral responsibility of the agent. First, the essence
does not get its property from the agent. Rather, the agent, once it exists,
gets its property from the essence. The problem for these subalternatives is
not that the fact about the essence and the existence of the agent jointly
entail that the agent has its corresponding subjunctive conditional prop
erty. The problem is the source of the agent's property of being such that if
it were in situation S it would do A. Because the essence has its property
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independently of the agent, and indeed independently of the agent's ever
coming to be in the situation, the fact that the essence has that property
precludes the agent from doing anything in the situation other than the act
mentioned in the specification of the property o f the essence. When a fact
about an essence such as (11) is incompatible with all the alternatives to
an act in the specified situation but one, namely, the act itself, and the fact
is counterfactually independent of all of the alternatives in that situation,
I say that the fact precludes all the alternatives to the act. This is necessarily
equivalent to asserting that this fact of independence, together with the
fact that the agent exists in the situation, if it ever arose, would ontologically
determine the fact that the agent does the act. Hence, the agent is deprived
of freedom and moral responsibility with respect to performing that act.24
Second, on these subalternatives, the fact that the agent has its subjunc
tive conditional property is itself independent of the fact that the agent
comes to be in the relevant situation. Due to the essence having its prop
erty, the agent, once it exists, would have its property whether or not the
relevant situation ever arose. But, even if we put aside consideration of the
source of the agent's property, the fact that the agent has its property (of
being such that the agent would do act A in situation S) independently of
whether the situation ever arises precludes the agent from doing anything
other than A when in S. That is, it precludes the agent from doing other
wise in S or even avoiding doing A when in S. So, the agent would not be
freely doing A in S when the agent acts.
There remains alternative (iii), which is perhaps more in the spirit of
Molinism than either alternatives (i) or (ii). On this alternative, the Molinist
adopts the position that nothing like (14) and (15) ontologically determine
fact (11), and that fact (11) would exist whether Socrates exists or not.25
So, in every possible world, the possession of the contingent subjunctive
conditional property by the given essence of the free creature is counter
factually independent of the existence of the creature. On alternative (iii),
there is nothing in any world that ontologically determines the fact that
the essence has this subjunctive property. This secures all facts like (11)
a place in the relevant creation situation, and so makes foreknowledge
of free acts possible by means of knowledge of the contents of the given
creation situation. But then, as argued above in considering the major
ity of the subalternatives under alternative (ii), if the essence contingently
has the subjunctive conditional property independently of whether the
essence is instantiated or not, and the essence were instantiated, the action
of the agent would become ontologically necessitated by the essence's pos
session of the property together with the situational fact. The crucial point
that deprives the agent's act of both freedom and moral significance is the
fact that the essence's having the subjunctive property, together with the
bare existence of the agent, ontologically determines the fact that the agent
himself has the corresponding subjunctive property.
It follows that, under the assumptions that I have made, including those
regarding the nature of facts and the framework P+, Molinism is false.26
The view of subjunctive conditionals that I have portrayed is one in which
for each subjunctive conditional of freedom the fact that the subjunctive
conditional proposition exists is included in the real creation situation. But
for each such proposition, there is in the real creation situation no fact that
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the proposition is true. For all of these propositions lack a truthmaker in
the real creation situation that would not ontologically determine, together
with some created facts, the agent's performing her act. On this view, there
are some true subjunctive conditionals of freedom, but their truthmakers
are facts about agents' acts done in circumstances in the real world, outside
of the creation situation. Hence, the facts that these propositions are true
are within God's power to prevent, and therefore cannot be included in the
real creation situation. Hence God cannot, just by knowing the contents of the
real creation situation, know what his free creatures would do in various sit
uations. There are no true genuine counterfactuals of freedom.27But if there
were, the truthmakers of these truths would ontologically determine that
the acts would be performed if the relevant creatures and situations were to
exist—depriving the agents of their freedom and moral responsibility.
III
Would the conclusion of the above argument be affected by replacing the
conception of structured facts that it employs with one of the other three
candidates for truthmakers that were outlined above? The answer is no,
because the relation of ontological determination would still hold between
the relevant items regardless of their nature. Nevertheless, certain differ
ences between these conceptions, especially between the conceptions of
facts and states of affairs should be acknowledged. We can deal simultane
ously with both the structured and unstructured views of states of affairs
because their differences won't matter to the points I want to make. On
both views, for any two states of affairs S1 and S2, S1 includes S2 if and
only if it is impossible that S1 obtains and S2 does not.28 (This is virtually
a form of entailment for states of affairs; we could just as well say 'entails'
instead of 'includes.') There is an important difference between
(F13)

The fact that Socrates has the property of being such that if he
were offered escape he would refuse

and (if there is such a conditional fact as)
(F13*) The fact that if Socrates were offered escape from prison, he
would refuse,
on the one hand, and
(S13*) The state of affairs that if Socrates were offered escape from
prison, he would refuse,
on the other, namely, the existence of (S13*) does not require the existence
of Socrates. Perhaps, then, (S13*) could serve as a truthmaker of
(P13*) The proposition that if Socrates were offered escape from pris
on, he would refuse.
Perhaps the actual creation situation includes (S13*) and the existence of
(P13*), where (P13*) is being assumed to be true. The argument against
the position that all this is in fact so cannot under this conception of truthmakers be that (P13*) must not be true in the creation situation because its
truthmaker must have a concrete constituent such as Socrates.
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Upon further examination, however, it becomes apparent that (S13*)
cannot itself be a truthmaker of (P13*) in a system like that employed by
Plantinga, which does not contain facts but does employ states of affairs
of some sort. It cannot even be the state of affairs that (S13*) exists that is
the truthmaker of (P13*), because (S13*) exists in every world (at least on
Plantinga's conception). It must be the obtaining of (S13*) that is the truthmaker. So, the following obtainings are truthmakers for the propositions
(P11)-(P15) that correspond to them.
(0 5 1 1 ) The obtaining of the state of affairs (S11) that S has the property
of being such that if the instantiation of S were offered escape
from prison, the instantiation would refuse
(0 5 1 2 ) The obtaining of the state of affairs (S12) that Socrates exists
(OS13*)The obtaining of the state of affairs (S13*) that if Socrates were
offered escape from prison he would refuse
(0 5 1 3 ) The obtaining of the state of affairs (S13) that Socrates has the
property of being such that if he were offered escape from pris
on he would refuse
(0 5 1 4 ) The obtaining of (S14) the state of affairs that Socrates is offered
escape from prison
(0 5 1 5 ) The obtaining of (S15) the state of affairs that Socrates refuses to
escape.
There are certain other features of this framework of states of affairs that
distinguish it from the framework of facts, which result from the feature
that states of affairs like (OS13*) do not require the existence of their sub
jects, in this case Socrates. For one thing, the conjunction of (OS13*) and
(OS12) co-include (= coentail) the state of affairs (OS13). More important
to our present purpose, while (OS13*) co-includes (OS11), (OS13*) can in
every case be regarded as ontologically determining (OS11). As a result,
(OS11), the fact about the essence of Socrates, is never needed to play the
role of truthmaker for (P13*). The role of immediate truthmaker of the con
ditional of freedom (P13*) can always be filled by (OS13*). Since the latter
does not require the subject's existence, (OS13*) can be claimed to be in the
actual creation situation.
In Section II above I applied alternatives (i), (ii), and (iii) to Molinism
from within a framework of structured facts, and offered arguments for
rejecting Molinism. Assuming that those arguments were sound within
that framework, we must now ask if applying these alternatives, or rather
their appropriate counterparts, to Molinism from within a framework of
states of affairs, such as Plantinga offers but with the added requirement
that a true proposition is made true by a truthmaker consisting in the ob
taining of a state of affairs, alters the force of these arguments so as to
salvage Molinism. I shall argue that the switch to a framework of states
of affairs makes no difference. The three alternatives in the framework of
states of affairs are basically isomorphic with the three alternatives in the
framework of facts, the principal difference being that (OS13*) fills the role
of truthmaker, rather than fact (11) or its counterpart (OS11).
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For brevity I shall summarize the alternatives by using the names of the
states of affairs in our example of Socrates, rather than stating the alterna
tives in a completely general way.
(i) (P13*) is true if and only if (S14) and (S15) obtain. The conjunction
of (OS14) and (OS15) ontologically determine (OS13). (OS13) ontologically
determines (OS13*), which is the truthmaker of (P13*). The conjunction of
(OS13*) and (OS12) does not ontologically determine (OS13). (OS13*) is
not independent of (OS12), (OS13), (OS14), or (OS15).
(ii) In some worlds (P13*) is true but it is not the case that both (S14)
and (S15) obtain. However, in every world in which (S14) and (S15) obtain,
the conjunction of (OS14) and (OS15) ontologically determines (OS13),
which ontologically determines (OS13*).
(iii) In some worlds (P13*) is true but it is not the case that both (S14)
and (S15) obtain. However, in every world in which (S14) and (S15) ob
tain, the conjunction of (OS14) and (OS15) does not ontologically determine
(OS13), which in turn does not ontologically determine (OS13*). Rather, in
every world in which (S13*) obtains, (OS13*) is independent of (OS12).
According to alternative (i) in the framework of facts, a subjunctive con
ditional is true if and only if the relevant situation occurs and the agent
performs the act referred to in the conditional. We saw that this entails that
there are no true genuine counterfactuals. This consequence holds regard
less of the ontology of the framework, and so it also holds in the framework
of states of affairs. On alternative (i) in this framework, (OS14) and (OS15)
ontologically determine (OS13), which ontologically determines (OS13*).
(OS13*) is not independent of the conjunction of (OS14) and (OS15). On
this alternative, the agent doing the act in the situation is the only reality
that brings about the obtaining of (S13*), i.e., brings about (OS13*).
All this preserves the freedom of Socrates' act of refusal, but gives up
the view, required for Molinism (with truthmakers), that the truthmaker
of (P13*) is in the actual creation situation, since on this alternative the
truthmaker would not exist without (OS14) and (OS15) which require the
creation of Socrates. Secondly, just as in the framework of structured facts,
this alternative would entail that every true subjunctive conditional would
have a truth value within God's power. God could prevent the truth of the
conditional just by choosing not to create the agent. Hence, on alternative
(i), the effect of the arguments is unaltered by the switch from the frame
work of structured facts to the framework of states of affairs.
On alternative (ii), in some worlds some subjunctive conditionals are
true even though the relevant situations and acts do not occur; but in every
world in which the agent does the act in the relevant situation, the agent's
being in the situation and performing the act ontologically determines the
truthmaker. With some differences of content, my objections to this alter
native (ii) parallel the objections made to alternative (ii) in the framework
of facts. As before, the objections can be divided into two camps: one that
deals with subalternatives of the type in which the truthmaker is not in
dependent of the agent's existence, and one that deals with those of the
type in which the truthmaker is independent of the agent's existence. On
subalternatives of the first type, (OS13*) is ontologically determined by
(OS13) and is not independent of the agent's existence, (OS12). (OS13),
unlike (OS13*), could not exist in the actual creation situation. Whether
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(OS13) is ontologically determined jointly by (OS14) and (OS15), or is a
brute state of affairs that ontologically determines (OS13*) and is not de
termined by (OS12) and (OS13*), the truthmaker (OS13*) could not exist
in the creation situation. Hence, God could not know what Socrates would
do just by knowing the contents of the actual creation situation.
Subalternatives of the second type are those which have the truthmaker
(OS13*) as being independent of (OS12), the state of affairs that Socrates
exists. First, consider that the peculiar state of affairs (S13*) is one which
not only fails to entail that Socrates exists, it also does not contain Socrates
as a constituent. It is a wholly abstract entity, like an essence or other prop
erty. So, when Socrates, the real, living, actual person, does come to exist,
he is immediately ontologically determined jointly by his existence and
by the obtaining of this abstract entity (S13*) to possess the property of
being such that if he were offered escape from prison he would refuse. In
short, (OS13*) and (OS12) ontologically determine (OS13). In evaluating
the freedom and moral significance of the act, this is really no better than
the agent deriving the subjunctive conditional property from the con
tingent state of affairs that his essence has a corresponding subjunctive
conditional property. In both cases the agent gets its property from the
abstract entity rather than the property of the agent determining that the
abstract entity has its corresponding property. When the agent comes to
be in the relevant situation, the abstract entity, which exists independently
of the agent, does not permit the agent to do anything other than the act
mentioned in the specification of the abstract entity.
Second, under these subalternatives, (OS13), that the agent has its sub
junctive conditional property, is itself independent of (OS14), that the agent
comes to be in the relevant situation. The agent, Socrates, would have his
property whether or not the relevant situation (offer of escape from prison)
ever arose. So, even when we put aside consideration of the source of the
agent's property, the obtaining of the state of affairs that the agent has its
property independently of whether the situation ever arises precludes the
agent from doing anything other than the relevant act. When (S14) comes
to obtain, its obtaining and (OS13) jointly preclude any alternative act to
Socrates' act of refusal. Socrates' act of refusal would be deprived of moral
significance; and he would not then freely refuse to escape.
On alternative (iii), as in (ii), there are some worlds in which some
subjunctive conditionals are true even though their antecedents and
consequents are not; the relevant situations and acts simply do not take
place. There are also worlds in which the states of affairs that make the
antecedents and consequents true do obtain, but in none of these worlds
is it the case that the obtaining of these states of affairs ontologically de
termines the obtaining of the states of affairs that are the truthmakers of
the subjunctive conditionals. To apply this alternative to our example: on
alternative (iii), the subjunctive conditional is (P13*), and its truthmaker
is (OS13*). The truthmakers of the antecedent and consequent of (P13*)
are (OS14) and (OS15) respectively. Now, whether or not the conjunction
of (OS14) and (OS15) includes (OS13*), under alternative (iii) the Molinist is bound to hold that the conjunction of (OS14) and (OS15) does not
ontologically determine (OS13*). Rather, (OS13*) would exist (that is, (S13*)
would obtain) whether or not Socrates ever existed. The truthmaker of the
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subjunctive conditional is, in this sense, independent of the obtaining of
the state of affairs that the agent exists.
The basic problem, therefore, still remains. If the obtaining of the state
of affairs (S13*) is independent of the existence of the agent, in the sense
that the state of affairs would obtain whether or not the agent were to exist,
then as soon as the agent comes to exist he has the subjunctive conditional
property, the having of which is ontologically determined by the obtain
ing of (S13*) and the state of affairs that Socrates exists. On alternative
(iii), the Molinist must hold that the obtaining of (S13*) is not ontologically
determined by anything else, such as future situations and events.
Finally, there is the conception of truthmakers that view them as unstruc
tured facts, simple entities none of which have individuals as constituents,
but which are entities (like sets of individuals) that have an ontological de
pendence on individuals, i.e., facts about individuals cannot exist without
them. By now I take it to be evident that all the principle arguments about
ontological determination would go through in a framework of unstruc
tured facts as well as of structured facts.

IV
My conclusion is that the principal arguments against Molinism which
were stated in the framework of structured facts have parallels in the other
frameworks of structured and unstructured states of affairs, and also of
unstructured facts. If these arguments are sound, there are just two al
ternatives. (1) Our acts are not freely performed and we are not morally
responsible for them for the reason that they are ontologically determined
by the situations in which they are done and the truthmakers of the rel
evant subjunctive conditionals. (2) No genuine counterfactuals of freedom
are true because the only true subjunctive conditionals of freedom are
those which have truthmakers that are ontologically determined by the
relevant situations and acts themselves. On either alternative, Molinism is
false. If in the creation situation the only way that God could know what
free creatures would do is by knowing which subjunctive conditionals of
freedom are true, or by knowing something that makes these conditionals
true, then God could not have foreknowledge of their free acts. It seems to
me that this is the only way that God could know on the basis of the creation
situation what free creatures would do. So, it seems to me that if there is
no other way to account for divine foreknowledge of free human acts than
through knowledge of subjunctive conditionals of freedom, divine fore
knowledge of human acts is inconsistent with human freedom.
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a relational property of “correspondence" itself or at least a property which
requires that there be a fact that makes the proposition true, and even God
could not know that a contingent proposition is true just be inspecting the
qualities of the proposition.
24. There is an affinity of this claim with a passage in Robert Adams's
“Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil," op. cit., p. 82, where it is
suggested that if whether person c would do an action a in s depends, not
on a property of the person c, but on a property of God's idea of c, this fact
“might seem to compromise c 's freedom of will."
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25. I am representing this claim as being part and parcel of the Molinist position. The claim contains two propositions. A) If Socrates were to
exist then fact (11) would exist (i.e., the essence of Socrates would have
the relevant subjunctive conditional property). B) If Socrates were not to
exist then fact (11) would (still) exist. In evaluating B, we are to assume
that in the actual world fact (11) exists, i.e., the essence actually has the
subjunctive conditional property. Since there is no ontological, causal, or
entailment relations between the antecedent of B, viz., the proposition
that Socrates does not exist, and the consequent of B, viz., the proposition
that fact (11) exists, it would seem to be true that the most similar world
without Socrates to the actual w orld—that is, a world wherein Socrates
does not exist but everything else is as much the same as the actual world as
possible—w ou ld have to be a world in which the essence of Socrates has
as many of the same subjunctive conditional properties as it has in the
actual world as is consistent with the nonexistence of Socrates. So the con
sequent of B, viz., the proposition that fact (11) exists, is true in that world.
Therefore, under alternative (iii), Molinism seems to be committed to the
counterfactual independence of (11) from the existence of Socrates. The
same applies to the case of Curley's essence considered above.
26. In (3), (P3), (S3), (9), (11), (13), (14), and (15) I have deliberately
left out an explicit reference to the condition of freedom. In Plantinga's
original works the freedom condition is put into the antecedent of the
subjunctive conditionals of freedom, whereas in Adams's relevant works
it is placed in the consequent. I have argued that if facts such as (9) and
(11) exist in the real creation situation, the actions of persons are neither
morally significant nor free. If the argument is correct and the freedom
condition is placed in the antecedent, the antecedent will be false in every
world which contains a creation situation with the purported truthmaker
of the conditional in it. Hence, the conditional of freedom will in every
such case be only vacuously true. In that case the subjunctive conditional
will not be a subjunctive conditional o f freedom. They are required to be
both contingent and capable of being nonvacuously true. If the freedom
condition is placed in the consequent, then given the argument the con
sequent will be false in every world which contains a creation situation
with the purported truthmaker of the conditional in it. This would make
the conditional false in every such world wherein the antecedent is true.
Again, the subjunctive conditional will not be one of freedom.
27. In replying to Robert Adams's demand for a ground of counterfactuals of freedom, Plantinga makes this observation: "It seems to me much
clearer that some counterfactuals of freedom are at least possibly true than
that the truth of propositions must, in general, be grounded in this way."
Alvin Plantinga, "Replies," op. cit., p. 374. I want to make two comments
about this remark in order to compare my own stance with Plantinga's.
First, I agree that any genuine counterfactual of freedom that has a con
tingent antecedent and a contingent consequent is possibly true. This is the
case because for every such proposition there is a possible world in which
both the antecedent and the consequent are true. No matter how alien
and disconnected the consequent is from the antecedent, we can always
conceive of a scenario in which there is a subjunctive conditional relation
between the two. But second, if we take Plantinga to be implying that
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it is more certain that some genuine counterfactuals of freedom are true
than that the truth of propositions must be grounded, then I must strongly
demur. It seems to me that it is much more certain that every true proposi
tion must have a truthmaker than that there are genuine counterfactuals
of freedom that are true. I really do not know what property one would
be attributing to a proposition in saying that it is true but that it has no
truthmaker. I think that the fact that there is a very near relative of the
counterfactual of freedom, namely, the probabilistic formulation of Robert
Adams "if x were in S then probably x would do A," examples of which
do very much seem to be true, helps to explain how we could mistakenly
think that genuine counterfactuals are true.
28. Cf. The Nature o f Necessity, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

